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Abstract 
We propose a new method to construct instruments for foreign aid flows that exploits business cycle fluctuation in donor countries. In addition, 
we present empirical results demonstrating that the first step required to produce these instruments is both feasible given the available data and 
promising based on how strongly predictive donor country economic circumstances are for the size of aid flows. 
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1. Introduction 
There is an immense literature in economics that attempts to discern the effectiveness of foreign aid in accomplishing what 
donors countries seek: economic growth, poverty reduction, improved public health, stronger local institutions. In recent years, a 
central focus of this literature has been the analysis of randomized controlled trials (RCTs): relatively small experiments in which 
a certain policy or intervention is applied to a randomly selected treatment group but not to a control group [1]. These trials 
provide donors with seemingly conclusive evaluations of the effectiveness of different approaches to poverty reduction or disease 
eradication, and are commonly seen as a good way to determine “what actually works” [2]. The two main objections against 
relying heavily on RCTs is that conclusions derived from them may, by their nature, exhibit limited external validity. Two main 
mechanisms drive this limitation: general-equilibrium effects, and institutional and political-economy factors [3]. 
 
A different empirical tradition, one that attempts to address these concerns not by using theory to derive general-equilibrium 
implications or by engaging in the study of institutions per se, examines the effects of foreign aid flows in the aggregate using 
cross-country regressions. It is worth elaborating a little more on some important recent work in this tradition, as our contribution 
here will be to propose a way of dealing with the problems of unobservable heterogeneity and omitted variables in such 
regressions that is different from previously applied methods. 
2. Previous Research 
Rajan and Subramanian [4], who also provide a concise overview of earlier work using cross-country regressions, present 
estimates that incorporate country fixed effects to absorb unobservable heterogeneity and omitted variables – at least to some 
extent, as well as an instrumentation strategy that addresses reverse causality concerns. Their instrument variables approach 
relies on the relative size of donor and recipient countries, as well as on the colonial past of the recipient countries as shifting the 
supply of aid. The results suggest that foreign has a very small effect on growth (that may be positive or negative). 
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Work in a somewhat similar spirit, focused on donor-recipient affinity, by Werker, Ahmed, and Cohen [5] exploits variation 
in oil prices during the 1970s as a shock to aid provided by Gulf countries to other Muslim countries, and finds that aid mostly 
appears to be consumed, in the form of imported non-capital goods. Nunn and Qian [6] focus on the supply of aid as well, 
specifically of U.S. food aid. The effects they study are on conflict, and their central finding is that an increase in food aid leads 
to more, longer civil conflicts. 
3. Proposed Approach 
Our proposed approach to addressing the reverse causality problem that these papers attempt to address is one that – like 
[4,5,6] – exploits supply-side shifts. The idea we explore is whether countries become more generous during boom times.  These 
shifts presumably produce more high-frequency variation than [4], while allowing for more comprehensive coverage of years, 
donors, and recipients than [5,6]: donor countries business cycle fluctuations. We do not present a full-fledged estimate of the 
effects of foreign aid on outcome variables of interest here, but focus instead on testing whether business cycle fluctuations 
possess explanatory power on the donor side. 
4. Results 
To see whether our approach could be a fruitful, we run regressions of the following type: 
 
οܣ݅݀݌݁ݎܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ௜௧ ൌ Ƚ ൅ Ⱦଵοܴܩܦܲ݌݁ݎܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ௜௧ ൅ Ⱦଶοܴܩܦܲ݌݁ݎܿܽ݌݅ݐܽ௜௧ିଵ ൅ ߝ௜௧, 
 
where aid can take the form of grants, net aid, gross loans, or net loans, and RGDP is real GDP. GDP data come from the 
2013 World Bank World Development Indicators, and aid data come from Table 2a of the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) data tables. We focus exclusively on aid flows from OECD countries. 
 
When we estimate this regression on a year-by-year basis, we obtain the results displayed in Table 1. Column 1 shows that for 
grants, a $1,000 increase in real GDP per capita leads to an additional $2 of aid money in the year of the shock, and in the 
subsequent year as well. This finding holds when we include country and year fixed effects, as column 2 indicates, and is 
statistically significant at conventional confidence levels. We find similar results, both in magnitude and statistical significance, 
for net aid. Loans, on the other hand, do not seem similarly affected, and may be driven more by donor country credit conditions 
than output changes per se. 
 
Table 1. Impact of economic shocks on aid. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆ Grants ∆ Grants ∆ Net Aid ∆ Net Aid 
∆ Gross 
Loans 
∆ Gross 
Loans ∆ Net Loans ∆ Net Loans 
per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait 
                  
∆ RGDP per capitait 0.00226** 0.00200* 0.00218** 0.00205* 0.00018 0.00024 -0.00006 -0.00001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ RGDP per capitait-1 0.00168*** 0.00202*** 0.00191*** 0.00218*** 0.00010 0.00014 0.00023 0.00021 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Controls 
Year Fixed Effects X X X X 
Country Fixed Effects X X X X 
Observations 1,132 1,131 1,132 1,131 1,132 1,131 1,132 1,131 
R-squared 0.044 0.160 0.043 0.139 0.001 0.053 0.001 0.049 
 
Note: This table reports regressions of the form: ∆ Aid per capitait = α + β1 ∆ RGDP per capitait + β2 ∆ RGDP per capitait-1 + εit, where aid can take the form of 
grants, net aid, gross loans, or net loans, and RGDP is real GDP. Each period t now spans eight years. GDP data come from the 2013 World Bank World 
Development Indicators, and aid data come from Table 2a of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) data tables. We focus exclusively on aid 
flows from OECD countries. Observations are for the years 1962 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered by country. Refer to the text for more detail. *** indicates 
p < 0.01; ** indicates p < 0.05; * indicates p < 0.1. 
 
The impact we see a year later from business cycle fluctuations leads us to inquire whether there are longer-lasting effects that 
we could use to study outcome variables that do not adjust instantly. To do so, in Table 2, we divide the sample period up into 
eight-year blocks, starting in the first year. We then estimate a regression similar to the ones described above. We find that the 
full impact for the eight-year period of a change in real GDP is similar in relative size to the sum of the aid flow changes in year t 
and t+1 from Table 1. In addition, the eight-year window effect of a year t-1 real GDP shock is comparable to that found in 
Table 1, suggesting that business cycle induced changes in foreign aid levels at least partially persist in the medium run. Columns 
5 through 8 of Table 2 serve to confirm our finding that unlike grants and net aid, loans do not seem to be affected by real GDP 
fluctuations. 
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Table 2. Impact of economic shocks on aid, 8 year intervals. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
∆ Grants ∆ Grants ∆ Net Aid ∆ Net Aid 
∆ Gross 
Loans 
∆ Gross 
Loans ∆ Net Loans ∆ Net Loans 
per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait per capitait 
                  
∆ RGDP per capitait 0.00391** 0.00554*** 0.00384** 0.00590*** 0.00009 0.00069* -0.00007 0.00036 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆ RGDP per capitait-1 0.00258** 0.00341* 0.00273*** 0.00333** 0.00000 -0.00022 0.00015 -0.00008 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Controls 
Year Fixed Effects X X X X 
Country Fixed Effects X X X X 
Observations 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 
R-squared 0.339 0.487 0.321 0.496 0.001 0.225 0.001 0.148 
 
Note: This table reports regressions of the form: ∆ Aid per capitait = α + β1 ∆ RGDP per capitait + β2 ∆ RGDP per capitait-1 + εit, where aid can take the form of 
grants, net aid, gross loans, or net loans, and RGDP is real GDP. GDP data come from the 2013 World Bank World Development Indicators, and aid data come 
from Table 2a of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) data tables. We focus exclusively on aid flows from OECD countries. Observations are 
for the years 1962 to 2013 and are calculated over 8 year intervals. Changes are calculated as the difference between the last year and the first year in each 
interval. Standard errors are clustered by country. Refer to the text for more detail. *** indicates p < 0.01; ** indicates p < 0.05; * indicates p < 0.1.  
5. Conclusion 
We have demonstrated here that business cycle frequency fluctuations in donor countries produce variation in foreign aid 
flows. This variation is plausibly orthogonal to local conditions in the recipient country, and can be exploited to study the effects 
of foreign aid flows. To do so, one does need to allocate this variation at the donor level to specific recipient countries. In future 
work, we plan on doing this by following an approach similar to the approach Boustan [7] followed to estimate the impact of 
African-American migration flows on northern cities in the U.S.  She predicts flows of African-American migrants to northern 
cities based on existing settlement patterns, and uses these predicted flows to instrument for observed flows. We will, similarly, 
generate predicted aid flows based on previous giving patterns and use those to instrument for observed flows of foreign aid. 
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